Civil Society Institutional Response: Peaceful Intervention to Resolve Armed Conflicts by Coronel-Ferrer, Miriam
Civil society institutional response:
peaceful intervention to resolve armed conflicts
Miriam Coronel-Ferrer
PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analyses written by PIDS researchers on certain
policy issues. The treatise is holistic in approach and aims to provide useful inputs for
decisionmaking. This Notes is a condensed version of “Institutional response: civil
society” written for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005 by the same
author. Ms. Barbara F. Gualvez helped in repackaging this Notes.
The author is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of
the Philippines, Diliman. The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of PIDS or any of the study's sponsors.
Philippine Institute
for Development Studies
Surian sa mga Pag-aaral
Pangkaunlaran ng Pilipinas
Policy Notes
No. 2006-03 (March 2006) ISSN 1656-5266
T
he term “civil society” has been in the
public consciousness for quite some
time now. Yet, many are still not
aware of the nature, purpose, history,
and activities of the various groups that com-
prise civil society.
This Notes thus explains what civil society or-
ganizations (CSOs) are in general. It specifi-
cally dwells on peace CSOs as they relate to
addressing the armed conflict situation in the
country. The Notes traces their beginnings and
expounds on their various responses to peace
and human security concerns in the country
as well as enumerates the other formations
under which CSOs have branched out. Finally,
it provides an initial assessment of civil society’s
institutional response—the enabling and hin-
dering factors that support or stymie the growth
and sustainability of the efforts of peace CSOs.
What are CSOs?
The term civil society organizations (CSOs)
includes organizations, institutions, and other
collectivities working and organized autono-
mously from the state to respond to societal
and political issues. Peace CSOs refer specifi-
cally to a segment of this broad range of Phil-
ippine CSOs that have a focused peace agenda,
i.e., framing their campaigns, services, and
other activities within a peace perspective or
advocacy for peace, or undertaking peace-
related activities and considering themselves
as peace organizations. Like most CSOs, they
generally undertake any or all of three roles in
society: (a) guardians of or watchdogs over the
state, (b) service-provider, and (c) advocates of
alternative policies. They engage not only the
state but also armed nonstate actors and act as





Most CSOs addressing the impact of armed
conflicts and promoting peaceful alternatives
evolved during the post-Marcos democratic
transition period. Among the early members
(late 1980s to early 1990s) are the individuals,
sectors, and groups who were part of the left
antidictatorship struggle. At the grassroots, they
include people who initiated new forms of
“peace organizations”—notably the peace
zones—to respond to the violence in their
midst; and those who sought to revive or
strengthen indigenous mechanisms for peace-
ful settlements in highland communities.
In Mindanao, former Moro National Libera-
tion Front (MNLF) combatants or support bases
became “peace and development” coopera-
tives in order to undertake developmental
projects. The rise in peace CSOs within and
cutting across Muslim, Christian, and lumad
(indigenous) sectors is particularly phenomenal
in this region where significant peace agree-
ments have been reached between the gov-
ernment and the MNLF and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) but where, sadly, an
unstable peace still prevails.
Peace CSOs and their principles
In the Philippines where the armed conflicts
are deeply rooted in social and political ineq-
uities, the peace process is not limited to the
“peace talks” between the government and the
different armed groups but also includes the
institution of the needed political, social, and
economic reforms in order to eradicate the
causes and manifestations of armed conflict and
political violence. The peace process aims to
find long-lasting solutions to the country’s do-
mestic wars. It gives importance to nurturing a
culture of peace, healing the wounds, and dis-
solving prejudices in communities and fami-
lies torn apart by conflicts. Its end goal is to
transform social, political, and economic re-
lationships into relations based on justice and
human dignity. In brief, the Philippine peace
process seeks to address both the negative (ab-
sence of direct and physical conflict) and posi-
tive (presence of justice and wellbeing) dimen-
sions of peace in the country.
The broad concepts of peace, peace process,
and peace building hew closely to the equally
broad concepts of human security and human
development. Their goals are congruent with
one another. Peace building usually refers to
activities in the post-conflict phase needed to
prevent the resumption of conflict. It is seen as
a necessary undertaking after a successful peace
process. But in the Philippines where there are
protracted conflicts and political violence even
after the forging of peace agreements, it has
not been easy to determine conflict and post-
conflict phases. Thus, peace building in the
present context is construed as the different
programs and activities undertaken by individu-
als and groups (government and NGOs) to sup-
port and sustain the peace process.
The civil society response
Approaches and strategies
In general, peace CSOs perform the same func-
tions as most other Philippine CSOs: to pro-
vide social and other services; to monitor state
(and the armed groups’) actions and guard
against abuse; and to advocate alternative poli-
cies, programs, and paradigms. Table 1 enu-
merates the responses of peace CSOs in accor-
dance with their roles.
Types of CSO peace interventions
The different dimensions of conflict and peace
building have required different interventions
which may be categorized as follows:
Peace constituency-building work is the
gradual process of reconstructing society,
mending the social fabric torn by protracted
conflict, and bringing about sustainable devel-PN 2006-03
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Table 1. Roles of peace CSOs
Civil Society’s Roles Peace CSOs’ Interventions Activities Illustrative Examples
Service-provider Relief and reconstruction Alleviation/mitigation of violence z Delivery of integrated programs for societal
and impact of violence thru reconstruction.
psychological trauma healing, z Support for peace-building programs like spaces for
relief operations, etc. peace/peace zones, housing and livelihood programs.
z Training programs on mediation, organizing,
Training programs Capacity building leadership, community development, and psycho-social
Program development Fact finding, documentation, legal trauma rehabilitation skills.
services
Other forms of assistance Development projects
Watchdog of the state Engagement campaigns Campaign for forging ceasefires or z The MILF’s unilateral suspension of military offensives
and the nonstate armed mediation respect of ceasefire agreements after the series of violence in February 2003 was partly
groups a response to the civil society calls, including that of the
Campaigns and support activities CBCP and the Bishop-Ulama League of the Philippines.
for continuity of peace negotiations, z President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s resumption of
and observance of agreements talks in 2001 was partly in response to public outcry
over the humanitarian consequences of the 2000
Informal dialogues and creation of offensives launched by former President Joseph Estrada
various consultative mechanisms and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
z The participation and presence of women, children,
Responses to specific concerns in Moro, lumad, and civil society groups in general in the
the context of continuing conflict peace agenda, processes, and structures have become
institutionalized—e.g., women and lumad representatives
Promotion of observance of were included in the GRP (Government of the Republic
human rights and international of the Philippines) panel and technical working commit-
humanitarian law tees; civil society representatives sit in panels and other
committees in the formal bodies.
z Peace CSOs exerted pressure to operationalize the
GRP-MILF Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee and
Local Monitoring Teams.
z Peace CSOs have instituted parallel third party
monitoring/promotion mechanisms such as the Bantay
Ceasefire (to monitor the GRP-MILF Ceasefire
Agreement) and the Sulong CARHRIHL (to promote
observance of the GRP-National Democratic Front
[NDF] Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law).
z Peace CSO and religious leaders, in particular,
facilitate the release of detained suspects, bodies, and
personal belongings of rebels killed in operations; of AFP
soldiers taken by the NPA; and the withdrawal of troops
in certain areas. There are now campaigns directed at
the two parties to respect  the rights of people doing
justice and peace work.
Advocates of alternative Policy advocacies Policy charge/reprioritization z Successful lobby for the creation of the National
policies, programs or Peace education Unification Commission (NUC), the National Anti-Poverty
paradigms Interfaith dialogues Institutional reforms Commission (NAPC), and the National Commission on




Civil Society’s Roles Peace CSOs’ Interventions Activities Illustrative Examples
Growth of peace consciousness, preceded by exposes which pushed government to act
and of peace organizations/ on cases and outbreak of violence, e.g., it put up Task
programs Force 63 to deal with conflicts arising from development
projects in IP communities. The Task Force’s responsi-
bilities were later transferred to the NCIP.
z Successful lobby for the adoption by the national
government of the Six Paths to Peace and the Social
Reform Agenda.
z Lobby for the passage of related laws (e.g., Anti-
Rape law, creation of NAPC and NCIP laws).
z Influencing how media writes about peace and conflict
and helping generate greater peace awareness among
media people and institutions.
z Institutionalizing peace studies, and peace and conflict
research in the academe. Holding interfaith dialogues at
the national and local levels to promote interreligious
harmony, tolerance and ecumenism.
opment and governance reforms. It also in-
volves peace education wherein some schools
have initiated awareness programs on the val-
ues of peace and social responsibility. At least
eight schools have declared themselves “peace
zones” that bar entry to armed groups and de-
mand respect for the schools’ or community’s
right to peace.
Conflict-reduction efforts are being done by
peace CSOs to address the impact of violence
on communities. They have campaigned hard
for the observance of human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law principles on the
conduct of war; and the cessation of hostilities
through unilateral declarations or bilateral
agreements. Communities on their own have
taken steps to keep the peace in their localities
by declaring their communities as peace zones.
Bantay Ceasefire and Sulong CARHRIHL are
another type of citizen initiatives aimed at stop-
ping direct violence.
Conflict settlement is something that peace
groups have tried very hard to help with. In
this regard, CSOs act as third party in conflicts
and follow-through negotiations, and provide
critiques and alternatives.
The attainment of peace also requires continu-
ing research and training (peace research and
training) of practical and analytical value. Da-
tabase gathering, descriptive and comparative
analyses of local and foreign experiences, and
theorizing on the ways to peace serve to guide
everyday action and contribute to the world
body of knowledge essential to local, national,
and world peace. On the other hand, trainings
equip leaders, activists, and community resi-
dents with skills needed in conflict prevention,
management, resolution, and transformation.
Lastly, social development work involves ac-
tivities beyond the provision of relief or tem-
porary shelter to displaced communities. They
help generate greater self-reliance, address the




Range of CSO formations addressing
the armed conflicts/promoting peace
Peace zones and other people’s organizations
for peace
“People’s organizations” (POs) may be defined
as organizations of individuals drawn from
among grassroots communities, sectors or other
groupings, committed to advance their shared
rights and welfare. POs are usually considered
“mass-based” organizations because they are
tightly organized groupings of ordinary citizens
banded together as a territorial group
(barangay, sitio, city, province) or a sectoral
(women, workers) unit for a common cause
(group or community welfare, environment,
human rights, peace). They are composed of
individual members with a set of officers who
are accountable to the mass membership. In
contrast, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), as “service-providers,” are distin-
guished from POs in that they are made up of
hired or voluntary staff who are accountable
to their board and funders.
The most solid manifestation of a focused peace
PO are the “peace zones,” the generic term
for community-based initiatives to stop and
prevent violence and to gradually restore and
enhance community peace and wellbeing. The
peace zones were usually formed after an up-
surge of traumatic violence. For example, in
Sagada, Mt. Province, the community declared
the town a peace zone after the 1988 killing
of two children by drunken soldiers followed
by the death of a pupil in an attack waged by
the New People’s Army (NPA) on the military
in the town’s public high school.  Armed
groups, arms, and hostilities were banned in
the town premises.
Peace zones rely largely on moral suasion to
impose their declaration and on the strength
of their community organization to negotiate
with the parties in conflict. From the late 1980s
to the early 1990s, more than 10 communities
have declared themselves peace zones. The
city-wide Naga Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declared in 1988 is the
country’s first peace zone. Most of the first
wave of peace zones were in areas affected by
the conflict between the government and the
CPP-NPA, namely, in Mt. Province, Kalinga,
Abra, Bicol, Negros Occidental, and North
Cotabato.
A new wave of peace-zone building mostly in
areas affected by GRP-MILF hostilities has re-
sulted in the formation of “Sanctuaries of
Peace” and “Spaces for Peace.” They were
formed with the aid of government and other
CSOs. Spaces for Peace were declared by 13
sitios and 5 barangays in Pikit, North Cotabato
after the 2000 wave of violence.
Independent “peace zones” have also been put
up in other places like those in Bgy. Bual in
Isulan, Maguindanao in response to a 1988
Christian-Muslim feud, and in other barangays
in Zamboanga del Sur and Lanao del Sur.
While more attuned to address intertribal, fam-
ily, and communal disputes, these peace zones
are also responsive to insurgency-related vio-
lence that erupts in their community.
Although sparse, new peace zones in GRP-CPP/
NPA affected areas have also sprouted in
Quezon and Mt. Province in 2004. Local gov-
ernment and AFP support for community-ini-
tiated peace zone is important as well as the
cooperation of insurgents. On this matter, the
MILF tended to be more supportive of the
peace zones than the CPP-NPA who have
maintained an ambivalent if not negative po-
sition against this type of initiatives.
Unlike the consolidated and grassroots-based
peace zones in villages and barangays, peace
zones declared in schools and bigger territo-
ries like cities and provinces tend to be onlyPN 2006-03
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symbolic. Government-initiated peace zones
also cause wariness. Examples include former
President Estrada’s 20 towns and one city in
Central Mindanao declared as peace zones in
2000 after the AFP overran MILF camps, and
President Arroyo’s declaration of portions of
Pikit after government offensives in 2003.
Peace coalitions
Coalitions and networks correspond to the
“network of effective actors” or a “collection
of representative actors from the political, so-
cial, and structural fields concerned with
peace-building in a specific conflict, whose pur-
poses are to enhance effectiveness through fos-
tering a holistic approach to peace-building
and to foster the development of new ‘theo-
ries of action’ that necessitate collaboration”
(Ricigliano 2002). The primary function of
such networks is “to supplement the limited
theory of action of any one organization.” They
have been referred to as “unofficial supple-
ments to negotiation.”
Various peace coalitions, some short-lived,
some sustained, have been set up to revive and
sustain political negotiations with the CPP-
NPA-NDF. The earliest was the Coalition for
Peace (CfP) set up by leaders of 22 Metro Ma-
nila-based organizations from several ideologi-
cal formations in December 1986 shortly be-
fore talks between the NDF and the Aquino
administration collapsed. The CfP participated
in the National Peace Conference (NPC) in Oc-
tober 1990, which issued a 7-point National
Peace Agenda that was presented to the GRP
and NDF.
In 1992, a gathering of 120 organizations con-
stituting themselves as the People’s Congress
drafted a “People’s Agenda for the First 100
Days of the New Government” addressed to
newly elected President Fidel V. Ramos which
called for the continuation and pursuit of the
abandoned peace process with the CPP-NPA-
NDF. Among these early post-1986 coalitions,
only the NPC is still operational and is focused
on institutionalizing reforms through its par-
ticipation in the National Anti-Poverty Com-
mission.
In Mindanao, various coalitions have sprung
up in the last decade. The Kusog Mindanao
umbrella covers the Mindanao Caucus of De-
velopment NGOs Network (MINCODE), the
Mindanao Business Council and associations
of local government officials and profession-
als. The Mindanao Peoples’ Caucus and the
Mindanao Peoples’ Peace Movement have a
mixed membership of Moros, christianized
settlers and lumad (indigenous peoples). To-
gether with other networks and NGOs, they
launched the Mindanao Peaceweavers. A Moro
coalition was also organized in Lanao del Sur
in 1999 called the Muslim Multisectoral Move-
ment for Peace and Development. It is com-
posed of nine sectors including the ulama, tra-
ditional leaders, youth, women, professionals,
and madrasah.
Of late, several peace coalitions have been
formed to address heightened violence and de-
velopments in the peace process. In 2002, for
instance, the Program on Peace, Conflict Reso-
lution and Democratization of the University
of the Philippines Center for Integrative and
Development Studies (UP-CIDS) initiated a se-
ries of meetings that sought to resuscitate coa-
lition initiatives on the peace front. They
adopted the name All-Out Peace Groups
(AOPG) to publicly advocate for support to the
peace process and privately engage the differ-
ent state and nonstate parties concerned. This
initiative was followed in late 2004 with the
formation of Sulong CARHRIHL after the GRP
and the NDF agreed to implement and observe




A number of NGOs and campaign groups are
linking gender, human rights, children’s rights,
disarmament, environment, foreign policy,
education, and social reform issues to the peace
process. Some of these are the Peace Educa-
tion Network (PEN), the Coalition Against the
Use of Child Soldiers, the Philippine Campaign
to Ban Landmines, and the Philippine Action
Network on Small Arms.
NGOs, centers and other programs
The churches have been staunch and influen-
tial peace advocates. Through regular organi-
zations like the Catholic Bishops Conference
of the Philippines (CBCP) and the protestant
National Council of Churches in the Philip-
pines (NCCP), they have participated in major
peace undertakings such as the monitoring of
the 1986 ceasefire agreement and the 1992-
1993 National Unification Council (NUC) con-
sultations. Various programs and offices were
put up to attend to the peace campaign, in-
cluding a CBCP-NCCP Joint Peace Committee
to coordinate local, national, and international
efforts. The CBCP’s National Secretariat for So-
cial Action, Justice and Peace (NASSA) cam-
paigns and coordinates the CBCP’s social ac-
tion concerns ranging from anti-corruption,
environment, and peace. In Mindanao, inter-
faith dialogues continue to be undertaken
through the Bishops-Ulama Forum and many
other local counterparts.
NGOs also play facilitative and coordinative
roles in peace undertakings. Other collabora-
tive efforts have prospered led by various
agents like the UNDP-Philippine Office, Inter-
national Alert, UNICEF Children in Situations
of Armed Conflict Inter-Agency Committee, In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
World Council of Churches, Southeast Asian
Conflict Studies Network, Asia Foundation, UP-
CIDS, Philippine Council of Islam and Democ-
racy, the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), the Mennonites Central Com-
mittee, and the Catholic Relief Services, among
others.
To date, the active and organized third-party
peace constituency concerned with the peace
process with the NDF remains small compared
to groups interfaced with the Moro peace pro-
cess.
Assessment of civil society
institutional response
The stumbling blocks to the peace process have
to do with the ambivalent policy of both the
state and insurgent groups, the conditions on
the ground that sustain the conflict, and the
lack of national consensus on the way to move
forward to achieve the needed social and po-
litical change as well as the peaceful settlement
of armed conflicts.
Areas for assessment
A UNDP assessment of Philippine civil society
peace building proposed to evaluate civil so-
ciety peace-building efforts on the following
aspects:
z Impact on the policy issue
z Impact on the ground-level situation
z Impact on the perception, attitudes, behav-
ior, and perspective of other stakeholders (com-
munity, other civil society groups, elements of
the state, and NSAs)
The above three areas for assessment were
deemed specific enough to be relevant in in-
forming present initiative as well as the imme-
diate future.
Table 2 provides a listing of impacts that can
serve as indicators of civil society successes.
They were culled from the various case stud-




Table 2. Impact of CSO peace interventions
Areas of Impact Illustrative Outcome
On the policy issue/environment
Agenda or policy z Adoption by the National Government of the Six Paths to Peace, Social Reform Agenda
z Passage of related laws (e.g., Anti-rape law, creation of NAPC and NIPC laws)
z Influence in the resumption of peace talks and end to military operations
z Heightened visibility of women, children, Moro, lumad, and civil society in general in the peace agenda,
processes and structures
z Influence on how media write about peace and conflict and generation of greater awareness among the
media.
z Declaration of Eid il-Fitr as a national holiday
Creation of formal mechanisms z Creation of the National Unification Commission, NAPC, and NIPC
z Operationalization of the GRP-MILF Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee and Local Monitoring Teams,
and institution of parallel third party monitoring (Bantay Ceasefire)
z Various consultative mechanisms
Specific peace/conflict mechanisms z Release of detained suspects, bodies, and personal belongings of rebels killed in operations; release of
AFP soldiers taken by the NPA; withdrawal of troops in certain areas
Impact on the ground level situation
z Mitigation of human rights violations through fact-finding missions and relief missions
z Less cases of illegal detention
z Reduction in indirect violence through extended local ceasefires even if short-term only
z Continuing dialogues
z Delivery of integrated programs to alleviate the impact of violence and assist in societal reconstruction
z Empowerment of people in regaining control over their lives through peace-building programs like spaces
for peace/peace zones, housing and livelihood programs.
z Help in resumption of economic activities, schooling, and building of unity and mutual trust
z Help to people by having options/alternatives to joining armed groups
Impact on the attitudes, behavior, perceptions of primary stakeholders
On the state/rebel group z Convincing of both parties to engage in dialogues and help in developing receptiveness to campaigns for
ceasefires and settlement
z Influence in having the military become more careful/conscious of its behavior in communities and with
political detainees
z More respect for and less suspicion over church people doing justice and peace work
On the community and citizens z Broadening of people’s consciousness toward peace constituency
z More peace organizations and peace advocates on the ground and establishment of a wide and deep
network of peace advocates that can mobilize and influence ground-level situation and top-level policy
z More human rights advocates
z More awareness of people of their human rights and justice and peace issues
z Growing interest in peace studies in the academe
z More attendance in peace activities
z Less young people joining rebels
z More learned mediation skills
z Better understanding by the public of other people’s or groups’ perspectives
z Growing preference for nonviolent conflict settlement practices in communities (based on reflections on
peace zones in Bual)PN 2006-03
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Peace building is long-term, norm-transform-
ing and norm-building. Indicators of positive
changes in norms on the part of government
and armed groups include a greater conscious-
ness to respect and observe human rights and
international humanitarian law. However, al-
though there have indeed been changes in
some areas and instances, on the whole, hu-
man rights violations still continue.
It is therefore still an uphill climb. Admittedly,
too, attempts at identifying and measuring im-
pact have been very preliminary. Most CSOs
do not have built-in monitoring and evalua-
tion components. More thorough studies, in-
cluding the use of quantitative methods, would
therefore need to be undertaken to measure
successes and impact.
Enabling and hindering factors
To be able to increase the chances of success
for many of the CSOs’ interventions, an iden-
tification of the enabling and hindering fac-
tors will be a good start.
Below are some of the identified factors.
Moro and Mindanao peace initiatives
Enabling factors:
z The availability of funds (from government,
foreign governments, and international NGOs),
resources, and capability-building projects as
an offshoot of the 1996 peace agreement.
z The Catholic church’s revitalized interest
in interfaith dialogues and peace building in
Mindanao which “set off a chain of events that
all became forces promoting dialogue”
(Larouse 2001).
z The MILF’s welcome and respect of “third
party” civil society intervention and its real
interest in attaining peaceful settlement.
z The many-sided interventions—from
grassroots to elite—which have provided an
array of tools to address the many aspects of
the conflict.
z The gross impact of several high-level hos-
tilities from 1997 to 2003—despite the 1996
GRP-MNLF peace agreement—which there-
upon mobilized people to act for peace and
achieve a deeper understanding of the con-
flict and search for alternative approaches.
z The presence of government support in key
cases, e.g., the barangay council or mayor in
promoting/upholding peace zones, interfaith
dialogues of the Bishop-Ulama Forum, and un-
dertakings especially in relief and rehabilita-
tion.
z Increasing “ownership” by the people of
the process through active intervention/partici-
pation in various mechanisms.
Hindering factors:
z Lack of skills and capacities to sustain
mechanisms and information
z Lack of financial resources to sustain peace
efforts
z Diversity of groups hinders united move-
ment to pursue effective solutions
Peace interventions nationwide
Enabling factors:
z Presence of initiating, sustaining and ca-
pable core
z Nature of the institution with the church
having the moral authority and can serve as
effective mediator; the academe having the
expertise and can do peace research and edu-
cation module development; and CSOs hav-
ing the legitimacy to participate and intervene.
z Presence of networks and social capital
which may be tapped for help.
z  Availability of resources that may be se-
cured from the mother organization of the one
serving as the core or secretariat, from funding
from local and international NGOs or govern-
ments, or through sharing or contributions
from coalition members.
z Use of appropriate and multipronged strat-
egies and approaches.
z Presence of supportive environmentPN 2006-03
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z Institutional track record of organizational
coalition success that enhances the capacity
to network, mobilize, and influence policy and
other stakeholders.
Hindering factors:
z Lack of and weaknesses in human and ma-
terial resources where there are limited or no
full-time staff/peace educators; people are over-
worked or are reassigned in different posts; and
some lack knowledge and understanding of the
diversity in cultural and religious practices.
z Lack of support and cooperation from
other sectors of society.
z Continuing governance problems like the
disappointment over failure of government as-
sistance to rebel returnees and continuing
threats they receive from both sides.
z Threats posed to peace work and affected
communities such as indiscriminate acts of vio-
lence on civilians by armed groups; contin-
ued suspicion by the military of religious and
CSO workers; and presence of armed groups
and powerful people with vested interests in-
timidate people in the communities.
z Difficulties in engagement of armed groups
where the NDF does not support localization
of peace negotiations, thus hampering local
initiatives and where CSOs lack the knowledge
of current policies, dynamics, leadership, and
changes in ideology in the communist insur-
gency.
z Other environmental factors such as the
cyclical and/or seasonal nature of conflict
which disrupt post-war physical and psycho-
social reconstruction; unstable “peace and or-
der” situation; natural calamities and other di-
sasters; and the distance between the affected
areas and difficulties in delivering services/un-
dertaking initiatives.
Conclusion: implications for policy
In the final analysis, the peaceful settlement of
the armed conflicts cannot be detached from
or is integral to the national democratization
process that includes social restructuring,
cleaning up of the military and police, com-
bating corruption, poverty alleviation, healing
and reconstruction of war-weary communities,
and the transformation of the Philippine state
to make it more autonomous from private in-
terests. Failure of the democratization process
to move forward substantially can only mean
a prolonged life span to the violent armed con-
flicts.
CSOs will continue to play important roles in
the democratization project, notwithstanding
the diversity, conflicts, and different capacities
among CSOs themselves. It would thus be im-
portant to continue to support civil society ca-
pability-building and CSOs’ various programs
and activities. Their capacities and effective-
ness of intervention, however, are limited by
the policies, attitudes, and behavior of the state
and the armed NSAs. As it is, the peace pro-
cess suffers from the structural infirmity of be-
ing dependent on the political leadership,
namely the Philippine president, who in turn
has a short timeframe and narrow political
agenda. The different government administra-
tions have exhibited varying interest and un-
derstanding of the armed conflicts. Thus, the
adoption of a “peace and development” state
policy and deeper rootedness of the human
security framework in government, civilian and
military institutions is an important interven-
tion that should be pushed by civil society. 
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